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Women and (In)Justice: The Effects of Employer 
Implicit Bias and Judicial Discretion on Title VII 
Plaintiffs 
 
Kya Rose Coletta* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Because I am a woman, I must make unusual efforts to succeed. If 
I fail, no one will say, “she doesn’t have what it takes.” They will 
say, “Women don’t have what it takes.”1 
 
Women’s presence in the legal profession has gradually shifted from 
complete exclusion2 to full integration in all sectors of the field. Women 
were first given a unique opportunity to work at large firms after World War 
II, likely due to either “sex-blind” hiring partners looking for talent fast or 
because they were hired temporarily and managed to stay on after the War.3 
After decades of virtually no movement, the number of women attorneys 
soared during the span of 1970 to 1980, from 13,000 to 62,000 (from 4 
percent to 12.4 percent).4 
The National Association of Women Lawyers recently sent 200 of the 
largest law firms in the Nation a survey regarding demographics of lawyers 
at varying levels, inquiring as to their partnership track structures and 
women’s initiatives.5 The results show that although women start in virtually 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S. 
Communications, Journalism Emphasis 2017, Santa Clara University. The author would like to thank 
Professor Emily Murphy and Professor Joan Williams for their valuable insight and advice in the research 
and writing of this Note. 
 1. KAREN DONNELLY, AMERICAN WOMEN PILOTS OF WORLD WAR II 23 (1st ed. 2009). 
 2. See Bradwell v. The People of the State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 132 (1972) (upholding denial 
of Myra Bradwell’s application to practice law in Illinois because “God designed the sexes to occupy 
different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws.”). 
 3. Large law firms constituted the most impenetrable sector for women due to their elitist 
recruiting processes, unmatched global legal networks, and work on precedent-setting cases. CYNTHIA 
FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 176 (2d ed. 1983) (noting that an essential factor in the increase in 
women lawyers was the accompaniment of a general rise in personnel). 
 4.  Id. at 5 (noting that women in law schools rose from four percent in the 1960s to eight percent 
by 1970, then to thirty-three percent by 1980). 
 5. See Destiny Peery, Report of the 2018 NAWL Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in 
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equal numbers as their male counterparts, they do not correspondingly 
remain balanced at the partnership level.6 As women rise in the ranks, top-
level female representation rapidly declines, leaving women to make up 
forty-seven percent of associates and only thirty percent of partners.7 Despite 
improvements in objective hiring practices, women still hit a glass ceiling 
and are unable to reach the highest levels of their employment potential.8 
However, the number of female lawyers alone does not tell the complete 
story of how women progress in a traditionally male-dominated profession. 
Many law firm cultures promote meritocracy, meaning “everyone has an 
equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual merits 
and efforts,”9 regardless of race or gender. Ironically, studies have shown 
that within organizations that overtly present themselves as meritocratic, 
employers still favor men over equally performing women in performance 
evaluations and compensation.10 These findings are two-fold. First, 
inequality may persist despite diversity policies and training programs 
because firms arguably adopt such practices for symbolic reasons rather than 
for their stated purposes.11 Second, employers are more prone to prejudiced 
attitudes when they feel that their “moral credentials” are satisfied vis-à-vis 
a meritocratic organization.12 Both findings suggest that certain meritocratic 
mechanisms may encourage bias by discouraging a close examination of 
subtle signs of prejudice. 
Another major impediment to women gaining more clout is that they 
are “sometimes steered away from major litigation, commercial matters, 
heavy client contact, extensive travel, or late night responsibilities . . . [and] 
are more likely to be relegated to supporting roles such as document 
preparation,” even when they lead case preparation.13 In a 1988 ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession report, Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
the Commission’s Chair at the time, urged the ABA “to recognize publicly 
 
Law Firms, MANAGING PARTNER FORUM 1, 2 (Mar. 1, 2019), http://www.managingpartnerforum.org/ 
tasks/sites/mpf/assets/image/MPF%20FEATURED%20WHITE%20PAPER%20-%202018%20NAW 
L%20Survey%20-%20PEERY%20-%203-1-19.pdf (“This year, 97 of 200 law firms completed all or 
significant portions of the survey.”). 
 6. See id. at 3. 
 7. See id. at 7 (finding that women make up thirty percent of non-equity partners, which is 
unchanged from last year, and twenty percent of equity partners). 
 8. See Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, a Commentary on State 
Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941, 941 (1991). 
 9. Emilio J. Castilla & Stephen Benard, The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations, 55 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 543, 543 (2010). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 543–44. 
 12. Id. at 567. 
 13. Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF. 11 (1988). 
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that gender bias [both indirect and overt] exists in the profession.”14 
Although it is significant that many barriers to women’s involvement in the 
law, such as explicit bias and lack of hiring,15 have primarily disappeared, 
one serious obstacle that remains is implicit bias in promotional decision 
making. 
The proper tool for measuring progress should instead rely on women’s 
professional advancement. Diversity at the top-tiers of the legal field is not 
merely a “women’s issue,” but rather an advantage to both law firms’ 
viability and their clients’ success. The combination of both men and 
women’s inherently different lawyering strategies and behaviors cover a 
broader array of approaches and etiquettes than at a male-dominated firm. 
However, without more, the seemingly subtle effects of implicit bias 
permeate the professional lives of women and observers, resulting in higher 
levels of stress, dissatisfaction, and intention to quit.16 Law firms ultimately 
face the costs associated with lost productivity and loss of employees,17 
issues that the proper safeguards could avoid. It is the position of this Note 
that unaddressed implicit biases severely affect women’s growth potential 
within a firm, and that growth in numbers within the field generally is not a 
sufficient metric of equality. Instead, women’s career advancement should 
be the critical factor in measuring actual progress. 
This Note examines the role that implicit biases play on sex-based 
promotions and employment decisions in large law firms, and the efficacy 
of current jurisprudence as a means of ameliorating these effects. This Note 
seeks to reformulate intentional disparate treatment theory to better address 
implicit bias so that disparate impact theory is not the only anti-
discrimination doctrine that addresses unintentional employment 
discrimination. Part II investigates the implications of implicit gender biases 
on behavior and how such consequences ultimately affect employment 
opportunities for women. Further, this Note discusses employment 
discrimination jurisprudence and how it shapes current models of disparate 
treatment. Part III analyzes the various structures of implicit discrimination 
and the barriers a Title VII plaintiff faces when bringing a claim against her 
employer. Finally, Part IV proposes how to improve this situation by making 
fundamental changes to a law firm’s culture, allowing plaintiffs’ “enhanced 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See DANA KABAT-FARR & LILIA M. CORTINA AS TOLD TO SUZY FOX ET AL., SELECTIVE 
INCIVILITY: GENDER, RACE, AND THE DISCRIMINATORY WORKPLACE IN GENDER AND THE 
DYSFUNCTIONAL WORKPLACE: NEW HORIZONS IN MANAGEMENT 109 (Cary L. Cooper ed., 2012) 
(explaining how “old-fashioned” overt sexism has undergone a radical decline in recent decades while 
contemporary forms of implicit bias persist). 
 16. Id. at 111. 
 17. See Lilia M. Cortina, Unseen Injustice: Incivility as Modern Discrimination in Organizations, 
33 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 55 (2008). 
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discovery” to set the level of judicial scrutiny, and shifting individual 
disparate treatment proof away from a presumption of invidiousness. If 
partners are not aware of their biases when promoting associates, the law 
firm lifestyle may not remain attractive to women and some men. Social 
cognition research and sociology research indicates that implicit bias is a 
significant source of employment discrimination, but current doctrine does 
not recognize nor redress it. 
 
II. IMPLICIT BIAS AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
This section first discusses the social cognition theory and how our 
brains create automatic categorizations. It then examines the complex issues 
that women in law firms experience in achieving high leadership roles. Next, 
it presents the disparate treatment theory in employment discrimination 
jurisprudence and the high hurdle of “intent” that plaintiffs must overcome. 
Lastly, it concludes with a discussion of judicial deference to professional 
employers and the jurisprudence that supports these findings. 
 
A. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 
 
The first question that people ask when they hear that someone just had 
a baby is, “Is it a boy or a girl?”18 This first categorization shapes much of 
our lives. To function, every person must unconsciously design mental 
strategies for simplifying their environment and acting on incomplete 
information.19 In part, we can survive by creating categories.20 The 
repercussions of automatic categorizations are two-fold. First, people 
unconsciously perceive members of the same group as being more similar to 
one another, and members of different groups as more dissimilar to one 
another.21 Categorization done this way is only meant to simplify the 
environment by sorting “fuzzy” differences into “clear-cut” distinctions.22 
Second, in determining whether an unfamiliar item is a member of a 
particular category, our brains automatically match it with a “typical” 
categorical prototype to assess its fit.23 Only with additional mental 
 
 18. Invisibilia: The Power of Categories, NPR (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/06/384 
104070/paiges-story. 
 19. See Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (2011). 
 20. Categorization helps people identify objects, make future predictions, infer the existence of 
unobservable traits, and attribute a causation of events. See id. at 1189. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. For instance, our brains carry images of the “typical letter ‘d’,” the “typical couch,” and the 
“typical lawyer.” Id. 
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processing can we identify these items as members of super- or subordinate 
categories.24 Cognitive psychologists refer to these “private theor[ies] of the 
nature of reality” as “schemas.”25 
According to schema theory, schemas, prototypes, and stereotypes 
function as implicit information structures that organize “input into, storage 
in, and recall from memory.”26 However, the luxury of cognitive economy 
comes at a price: These categorical structures bias what we see, how we 
interpret it, and how we store it into memory.27 In intergroup relations, such 
as within a law firm setting, theses biases—facilitated through perception, 
inference, and judgment—can cause discrimination “whether we intend it or 
not, whether we know it or not.”28 
Bias reduction research heavily draws upon a “dual-process model of 
social cognition” that creates a System 1/System 2 structure of automatic and 
controlled processing.29 Both Systems of information processing represent 
the ways that individuals make sense of the world: System 1 is automatic, 
unconscious, and “demanding of few cognitive resources”; in contrast, 
System 2 is conscious, controlled, and “resource-intensive.”30 Although 
people tend to believe nearly all of their choices are deliberate, “[m]ost of a 
person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and 
deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by 
features of their environment that operate outside of conscious awareness 
and guidance.”31 More often than people care to believe or admit, we are 
operating in a System 1 structure. For example, social psychologist Henri 
Tajfel and his colleagues designed the “minimal group paradigm” 
experiment that grouped subjects according to what they were told and then 
asked each subject to evaluate members within their group and members 
within the other group.32 Some groups were divided based on being labeled 
“blue” or “green.”33 Other times, subjects were told they were grouped 
 
 24. Id. at 1190. 
 25. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
COGNITION 161, 166 (1984). 
 26. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1209. 
 27. See id. at 1190. 
 28. Id. 
 29. PAUL BREST & LINDA H. KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 334 (2010). 
 30. Id. at 334–34 (noting that we can observe neurological substrates underlying this distinction 
through functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”)). 
 31. John Bargh & Tanja Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
462, 462 (1999). 
 32. See generally Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
1 (1982). 
 33. Id. at 23. 
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according to whether they under or overestimated the size of dots.34 The 
results showed that once the concept of “groupness” was introduced,35 
people perceived ingroup members as being more similar and outgroup 
members as being more dissimilar to themselves. Within the employment 
context, the “conscious [and] deliberate” desire to exclude women has 
declined,36 but both social psychologists and courts are seeing more implicit 
discrimination, often absent an intent to disfavor outgroup members.37 The 
various forms of these implicit biases will be discussed in the following sub-
section. 
Although there are two measures to assess bias, direct and indirect, 
researchers are reluctant to rely on direct measures because individuals may 
worry about the social consequences of admitting their bias,38 and 
consequentially, the results may not be reliable. For example, even if a 
person says that men and women are equally good at science, they may 
associate science more strongly with men without being actively aware of it. 
Many people who advocate for the egalitarian norm that men and women are 
equal inadvertently harbor negative associations about women at the same 
time.39 Though it is difficult to reliably identify whether a person will 
discriminate based on their own stated beliefs or values, any such bias is best 
identified by understanding how a person implicitly categorizes information. 
Following the actions of the decision maker that lacks outward 
discriminatory intent is one reason why System 1 measures have become 
critical in the field of social cognition. Such measures assist psychologists in 
understanding categorization as a cognitive mechanism that simplifies the 
task of processing and storing information about others into memory. Unlike 
direct measures, indirect measures do not require verbal reporting of 
attitudes or beliefs; instead, a researcher infers whether a bias exists from a 
pattern of responses.40 For example, a “blind audition” study demonstrated 
that implementing blind auditions for orchestra seats improved a woman’s 
chances of getting hired by up to twenty-five percent.41 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. In each experiment, group assignment was arbitrary. 
 36. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1241; see also Tajfel, supra note 32, at 22 (arguing that to blame the 
“cause” of society’s issues solely on the evil intentions of individual actors is a “conspiracy theor[y],” 
because intergroup functions must be acknowledged and attributed, as well). 
 37. See generally Tajfel, supra note 32. 
 38. Gregory Mitchell, An Implicit Bias Primer, 25 VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y AND THE L. 28, 31 (2018) 
(arguing that current research on implicit bias has not improved our capability to predict and prevent 
discrimination). 
 39. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). 
 40. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 32. 
 41. Claudio Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions 
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 734–37 (2000). Researchers found that “the screen 
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If a person has been made aware of and rejects stereotypes or attitudes 
associated with an outgroup member, social psychologists have found that 
those stereotypes and biases do not just disappear.42 There are various 
measures for studying implicit biases, but the Implicit Association Test 
(“IAT”) is by far the most popular.43 The IAT is a research tool that assesses 
cognitive associations by measuring how closely individuals’ brains link 
concepts.44 Participants are required to categorize stimuli that briefly appear 
on a computer screen as quickly as they can.45 The brevity of the stimuli 
deliberately activates System 1 processing so participants cannot stop to 
think about the reasoning behind their choice. Individuals’ cognitive 
associations may be benign (“dogs and cute”) but may also be prejudicial 
(“women and passive”). The purpose of the experiment is to understand how 
schemas may distort new, incoming information about members of different 
groups and thereby lead to categorization of in- and outgroup membership. 
In the example above, what determines what incoming information will 
prime which schema rests on the participant’s memory of “dogs” and 
“women.” Since gender is often apparent, and social contexts emphasize 
categories, gender-based schemas are likely to be implicated in the 
processing of information about other people. Social psychologists believe 
that these cognitive associations lead to implicit bias, which can influence 
subtle forms of discrimination.46 
For example, in the gender-career IAT, participants are presented with 
four types of stimuli: words representing career (e.g., salary, management, 
business), words representing family (e.g., marriage, home, children), 
pictures of male individuals, and pictures of female individuals. If 
participants respond more quickly to the portion of the test that associates 
“female” and “family” rather than “male” and “family,” then the Harvard 
research tool infers that the test-taker holds an implicit negative bias towards 
females and career associations. It indicates that participants do not need to 
resolve any tension when stimuli are compatible rather than when stimuli are 
incompatible. IAT studies have shown that both men and women tend to link 
“female” with “family” and “male” with “career.”47 The IAT is a powerful 
tool that demonstrates the existence of unconscious, automatic biases. 
 
increases by [fifty] percent the probability that a woman will be advanced from certain preliminary rounds 
and increases by several-fold the likelihood that a woman will be selected in the final round.” Id. at 738. 
 42. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 29, at 335. 
 43. Beth Azar, IAT: Fad or fabulous?, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 44, 44 (2008) (noting that 
IAT has received more than five million visits to its website). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Mitchell, supra note 38, at 32. 
 46. See Azar, supra note 43. 
 47. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration 
Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101, 105, 108–09 (2002). 
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B. THE UNIQUE STRUCTURE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
 
One wonders why the basis of women’s inequality remains outside the 
confines of legal solutions. This limitation can be explained by means of the 
glass ceiling metaphor. It portrays an invisible and unauthorized barrier in a 
seemingly nondiscriminatory law firm that prevents women from securing 
top professional positions.48 The additional obstacles that some women face, 
however, perhaps as a minority49 or a mother,50 may feel more like a 
labyrinth, where they must combat new obstacles at every turn.51 
In recent years, legal research began looking to implicit bias to explain 
workplace discrimination. Extrapolation of the many masks that implicit bias 
wears is advanced by Professor Joan Williams and the Center for WorkLife 
Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, a research 
and advocacy center that seeks to “interrupt” racial and gender bias in the 
legal profession.52 Researchers surveyed 2,827 participants either working 
in-house or at law firms.53 Findings report four distinct patterns of gender 
bias, each denoting their own particular set of challenges and implications. 
First, “Prove-It-Again!” (“PIA”) is a descriptive bias that depicts the 
need for women to repeatedly work harder “in order to be seen as equally 
competent” as their male counterparts.54 A person’s underlying assumptions 
about the “typical woman”55 are preserved by the principle that information 
supporting preexisting stereotypes is perceived and remembered while 
contradicting information is unnoticed and ultimately forgotten.56 In 
Williams’s study, white women report at rates twenty-five percent higher 
than white men for having to go “above and beyond” to get the same 
recognition as others, and forty-four percent higher for receiving messages 
that they “do not fit in” with the image of a lawyer.57 In comparison, women 
 
 48. Carol Hymowitz & Timothy D. Schelhardt, The Glass-Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem to 
Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them from Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., March 24, 1986, at 1–3. 
 49. See Executive Summary on You Can’t Change What You Can’t See: Interrupting Racial & 
Gender Bias in the Legal Profession, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF. 9 (2018) (noting 
that women of color report the highest levels of bias of any group). 
 50. See id. at 8 (indicating a significant bias against mothers and fathers who take parental leave). 
 51. See generally ALICE H. EAGLY & LINDA L. CARLI, THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH 
ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME LEADERS (2007). 
 52. Bias Interrupters, CENTER FOR WORKLIFE Law, https://biasinterrupters.org/ (last visited Feb. 
26, 2020). 
 53. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 29, at 7. 
 54. Id. at 3. 
 55. Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and 
Prescriptive Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POL’Y, AND L. 665, 671 (1999). 
 56. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR 
PATTERNS WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNOW 24–25 (2014). 
 57. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 7–8 (noting that 
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of color report at rates thirty-two percent higher than white men for being 
held to higher standards and at rates of fifty percent higher for being 
mistaken for administrative or janitorial staff.58 
Second, “Tightrope” is a prescriptive bias that originates from beliefs 
about how women should behave.59 The tightrope signifies the fine line 
women must walk between behaving in a traditionally feminine manner, thus 
exacerbating PIA problems, and acting in a traditionally masculine manner 
and receiving backlash for it.60 The consequence of conflating masculinity 
and femininity with biological sex is that women must make a choice: Do I 
want to be liked but not respected or be respected but not liked?61 Since 
traditionally feminine behaviors “signal deference and subordination,”62 
undervalued work is often given to women who display such traits (e.g., no 
client contact or rainmaking opportunities), administrative work (e.g., taking 
notes or scheduling meetings), emotional work (e.g., “he’s upset, can you 
help?”), and literal housework (e.g., party planning).63 White women report 
at rates twenty-one percent higher than white men for doing administrative 
tasks and women of color reported at rates eighteen percent higher for doing 
office housework.64 Not wanting to appear uncooperative or unsupportive, 
women may feel bound to agree to such tasks.65 In a study on the glass 
ceiling, Morrison described the professional women paradox: 
 
It was essential that they contradict the stereotypes that their male 
executives and coworkers had about women—they had to be seen 
as different, “better than women” as a group. But they couldn’t go 
too far, to forfeit all traces of femininity, because that would make 
them too alien to their superiors and colleagues. In essence, their 
mission was to do what was not expected of them, while doing 
enough of what was expected of them as women to gain 
acceptance. The capacity to combine the two consistently, to stay 
within a narrow band of acceptable behavior, is the real key to 
success.66 
 
percentage points are calculated against that of white males). 
 58. See id. at 7. 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. See WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 56, at 61. 
 61. See Susan T. Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting versus (Dis)liking: Status and Interdependence 
Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 473, 476 (1999). 
 62. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 56, at 65. 
 63. Id. at 65–70. 
 64. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 8. 
 65. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 56, at 68. 
 66. ANN M. MORRISON ET AL., BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: CAN WOMEN REACH THE TOP OF 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CORPORATIONS? 54, 54–55 (1992) [emphasis in original]. 
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Third, “Maternal Wall” describes the professional marginalization of 
women once they have children, resulting in low-quality assignments, being 
passed over for promotions, being paid less, and being stigmatized for 
working part-time.67 Maternal Wall consists of both prescriptive bias, like 
women should be at home or working less, and descriptive bias, stemming 
from strong negative assumptions about the competence of and commitment 
from mothers.68 For example, white women reported at rates thirty-six 
percent higher than white men for having their competence or commitment 
questioned after having kids.69 
Fourth, “Tug-of-War” portrays the divide among women within a law 
firm as they each confront and adapt to masculine traditions in the 
workplace.70 A typical example of this pattern is the idea that there is only 
room for one woman at the top, so a rivalry ensues.71 It is not to say that men 
don’t experience office politics too, but rather that “gender bias against 
women often fuels conflicts among women.”72 
While implicit bias may appear subtle at first, its effects permeate the 
lives of working women, often as a manifestation of incivility.73 This pattern 
is particularly true with the rise of policies that strictly prohibit gender 
discrimination. One can mask discrimination, even unintentionally, behind 
every day acts of incivility and continue to project an unbiased image.74 
Several studies have indicated that as employees experience greater 
incivility—such as direct and physical types of hostile behavior—their 
reported levels of stress, dissatisfaction, and intention to quit increase.75 In 
turn, observers of subtle incivility—such as rude or impolite behavior—
report lower job satisfaction and higher turnover intentions.76 The costs 
associated with the loss of employees, and lost productivity as a result, 
 
 67. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 8. 
 68. See WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 56, at xxi. 
 69. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 8. 
 70. Id. at 3. 
 71. See WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 56, at 179. 
 72. Id. at 180. 
 73. See KABAT-FARR & CORTINA, supra note 15, at 111. 
 74. Lilia M. Cortina, Unseen Justice: Incivility as Modern Discrimination in Organizations, 33 
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 1, 55 (2008). 
 75. See Christine M. Pearson et al., Assessing and Attacking Workplace Incivility, 29 
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 123 (2000); Christine M. Pearson et al., When Workers Flout Convention: 
A Study of Workplace Incivility, 54 HUMAN REL. 1387 (2001); Lilia M. Cortina et al., Incivility in the 
Workplace: Incidence and Impact, 6 J. OF OCC. HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 64 (2001); Lilia M. Cortina et al., 
What’s Gender Got to Do with It? Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 235 (2002). 
 76. Kathi Miner-Rubino & Lilia M. Cortina, Working in a Context of Hostility Toward Women: 
Implications for Employees’ Well-Being, 9 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 107 (2004) 
(finding that gender-based incivility affects employees even in the absence of personal experiences). 
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ultimately fall on employers.77 These studies serve as reminders not only of 
the prevalence and automaticity of the implicit biases that affect professional 
women and group norms but of the ample room for interference and 
improvement. 
 
C. TITLE VII AND THE ROLE OF INTENT IN ESTABLISHING LIABILITY 
 
 Upon navigating the implicit impediments of a workplace, women must 
begin navigating the intricacies of a courtroom. This subsection first 
discusses employment discrimination jurisprudence and the three models of 
proof that resulted. Next, it examines the judiciary’s unwillingness to 
interfere with decisions made by upper-level employers, as opposed to entry-
level employers. This subsection highlights that the unworkable burdens 
placed on Title VII plaintiffs ultimately encourage them to settle rather than 
allow them to effectuate real change.  
 
1. Proving “Discriminatory Intent” in Individual Disparate Treatment 
Cases 
 
Gender is a dominant force in the employment discrimination 
jurisprudence context. The prohibition of workplace discrimination based on 
sex is one of the fundamental repercussions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”).78 Although Congress initially passed the Act to redress 
widespread racial discrimination, Title VII also prohibits employment 
practices that limit individuals based on “color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”79 The law is intended to do more than resolve disputes; it is designed 
to “alter social conditions.”80 However, the employment discrimination 
jurisprudence initially designed to address overt and explicit discrimination 
has not updated to reflect modern types of discrimination. While the 
Supreme Court has rejected old models of proof, it has notably done so 
without overturning a single case.81 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,82 the Supreme Court recognized 
 
 77. See Cortina, supra note 17, at 55. 
 78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for 
Changed Social Conditions, G.W. LAW FAC. PUB. & OTHER WORKS 1, 3 (2014). 
 81. See generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); AT&T v. 
Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2451 (2011). 
 82. See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 324 (1971) (holding that Title VII was intended 
to prohibit not only open discrimination but also neutral employment practices that, regardless of intent, 
result in discrimination on the basis of a protected trait). 
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two forms of discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. While 
disparate treatment refers to treating equally qualified women differently 
than men, disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral practice affects 
both men and women differently.83 In the landmark case McDonnell Douglas 
v. Green, the Court set forth the pretext model of disparate treatment for 
proving intentional discrimination in scenarios where only circumstantial 
evidence is accessible.84 
Title VII plaintiffs establish a prima facie case for employment 
disparate treatment by showing that: (1) they are members of a class 
protected by Title VII; (2) they are qualified for the job; (3) despite being 
qualified, they were denied the promotion; and (4) the employer continued 
to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications.85 If the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to refute it 
by stating a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”86 for their decision not to 
promote the employee. If successfully rebutted, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s justification was merely a 
“pretext or discriminatory in its application.”87 At its core, plaintiffs must 
prove that the employer’s justification was a pretext—not the actual 
reason—for a discriminatory decision. Disparate treatment jurisprudence 
tends to favor employers because they merely have to point to a legitimate 
justification for their decision.88 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court gave qualified 
acknowledgment to the concept of mixed-motive theory in a case involving 
a woman who was refused partnership.89 Plaintiffs can succeed in mixed-
motive cases if they can prove that employment decisions can, and do, rest 
on both “legitimate and illegitimate” reasons.90 In Price Waterhouse, 
partners could submit written comments on each candidate elected for 
partnership; there were no fixed guidelines for the comment procedure and 
the recommendations and comments were weighed heavily by the 
Admissions Committee.91 Of the eighty-eight individuals nominated for 
 
 83. See Linda H. Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in 
Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 835, 835 (2004). 
 84. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 85. See id. at 802. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 807 (noting that a plaintiff may include relevant evidence to any showing of pretext 
including, but not limited to, an employer’s treatment of the employee during employment, the 
employer’s policies for minority employment, and statistics of the employer’s policies and practices). 
 88. SUSAN G. MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: WOMEN’S RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE LAW 77 
(2003). 
 89. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) [hereinafter Price Waterhouse]. 
 90. MEZEY, supra note 88, at 77. 
 91. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232. 
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partnership, Ann Hopkins was the only woman.92 While Hopkins was 
praised for securing more significant contracts for the accounting firm than 
any other nominee, partners described her as “macho” and 
“overcompensate[ing] for being a woman.”93 To “improve her chances for 
partnership,” Hopkins was advised to “walk more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”94 
The Court relied on social psychologist Doctor Susan Fiske’s expert 
testimony regarding the partnership selection process. According to Fiske, 
Hopkins’ uniqueness as the only woman candidate and the subjectivity of 
the promotion process in allowing “sharply critical remarks” likely fostered 
an environment for “sex stereotyping.”95 Fiske reviewed not only overtly 
sex-based comments but also gender-neutral comments96 made by partners 
who barely knew Hopkins, yet were highly critical of her.97 The Court held 
that once a plaintiff proves that her gender is a motivating factor—as 
opposed to the sole motivating factor—in an employment decision, the 
employer must then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would 
have made the same decision even if her gender was not taken into account.98 
Employers in a mixed-motive case must provide “objective evidence”99 that 
a legitimate reason was present at the time of the employment decision, a 
benefit to employees who rarely have enough evidence to prove that their 
gender was the critical factor.100 As a result, Price Waterhouse allows 
women legal relief for discrimination based on a failure to conform to 
stereotypical gender norms. 
 
 
 
 92. See id. at 233. 
 93. Id. at 235. 
 94. Id. at 235–36 (observing that because female partnership candidates were evaluated in sex-
based terms in previous years, candidates were viewed more favorably if they “maintained their 
femin[in]ity,” rather than being identified as a “women’s lib[b]er”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. The amount of Title VII cases acknowledging unconscious bias are exceedingly small. See 
Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 113-12 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming 
judgment for plaintiff because the decision not to promote her was “determined by a subtle, if 
unexpressed, bias against women”); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 
1981) (noting that “disdain for women’s issues…is evidence of a discriminatory attitude towards 
women.”). 
 97. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
 98. See id. at 258. 
 99. After Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence urging mix motive theory to only 
apply to cases involving direct evidence, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 broadened the standard from “the 
motivating factor” to “a motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90 (2003) (determining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 intended to encompass circumstantial 
evidence, not just direct evidence). 
 100. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252. 
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2. Litigation Impediments: A Reluctant Judiciary 
 
Even if a woman can establish a prima facie case for a disparate 
treatment claim, she faces a judiciary reluctant to interfere with her 
employer’s professional judgment.101 While courts are more vigorous in 
scrutinizing employment decisions for entry-level positions, they give 
considerably more deference to employment decisions made by upper-level 
or professional employers. An argument that entry-level decisions are more 
objective, such as measuring the output of a product, than professional 
choices, such as candidates’ collegiality and leadership skills, does not 
justify abandoning Title VII’s prohibition against employment 
discrimination.102 The judiciary’s unwillingness to inspect the merits of a 
case or the standards used to evaluate an employee’s work creates an 
unsettling and nearly impossible burden for plaintiffs.103 
Given the courts’ reluctance to insert themselves into substantive 
decision-making, “victorious” plaintiffs either settle or win on procedural 
grounds. In Hishon v. King & Spalding,104 a female associate was hired by a 
well-known firm that assured her that partnership candidates are considered 
on a “fair and equal basis” after five or six years.105 After seven years and 
two partnership rejections, Hishon filed a Title VII claim.106 King & 
Spalding argued that partnership is a voluntary association, and applying 
Title VII to its decisions implicates its First Amendment right to freedom of 
association.107 The Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument by 
holding that Title VII bars discriminatory employment decisions concerning 
“term[s], condition[s], or privilege[s] of employment.”108 The case settled 
before Hishon could establish a prima facie case.109 Although Hishon is a 
 
 101. See Tracy A. Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts’ Failure to Apply 
Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 268 (1994); see also Anjum Gupta, Dead 
Silent: Heuristics, Silent Motives, and Asylum, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 28 (2018) (attesting to Baron’s 
findings that gender bias in the judiciary is well-documented and can have a real impact on decision 
marking); Terry Carter, Implicit Bias is a Challenge Even for Judges, ABA J. (Aug. 5, 2016, 9:58 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/implicit_bias_is_a_challenge_even_for_judges (identifying de-
biasing solutions for judges is essential in the application of justice because such outcomes can be “just 
as harmful as if they were explicit biases.”). 
 102. See Baron, supra note 101, at 268. 
 103. See MEZEY, supra note 88, at 159. 
 104. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 105. Id. at 71–72. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 80. 
 108. Id. at 75. 
 109. While Hishon’s case was pending before the Supreme Court, partners at King & Spalding held 
a swimsuit competition for its female summer associates, awarding a prize to the female “body [they’d] 
like to see more of.” Rita E. Hauser, Do Not Approach the Bench Miracle on Grub Street, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/09/books/do-not-approach-the-bench-miracle-on-
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victory for women pursuing partnership, courts’ hesitation to interfere in law 
firm’s decision-making process remains intact. 
Courts’ adherence to the McDonnell Douglas model of disparate 
treatment proof essentially requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer 
lied to the court by offering a “pretext” for discrimination.110 In Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, a female associate was put on 
partnership track despite being told that she did not fit the mold “since she 
was a woman.”111 Notwithstanding receiving partners’ positive evaluations 
and never working more than 500 hours on a single matter,112 Ezold was 
assigned smaller, less complicated civil matters; one of her more significant 
assignments was reassigned to a male associate.113 Significantly, a partner 
described Ezold as being trapped in a catch-22: The department “would not 
assign her complex cases, yet she received negative evaluations for not 
working on complex cases.”114 The District Court found the employer’s 
reason for denial to be a pretext for discrimination in light of the above 
circumstances.115 The Third Circuit reversed, however, finding that the 
District Court “impermissibly substituted its own subjective judgment for 
that of Wolf in determining that Ezold met the firm’s partnership 
standards.”116 Now, the trier of fact shall only consider the legitimacy of the 
employer’s justification, not explore the reasons behind it.117 In effect, the 
appellate court shielded employer justifications by restricting a court’s 
examination to a firm’s subjective standards and necessarily requiring 
plaintiffs to produce a “smoking gun.”118 
In short, in applying current disparate treatment theory to cases 
involving professional subjective decision-making, plaintiffs will find 
themselves in a difficult position. While judges will use the model to grant 
broad discretion to high-level employers, its application will ultimately place 
severe and unworkable burdens on employees by encouraging them to settle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
grub-street.html. 
 110. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1178. 
 111. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 112. As opposed to the 600 hours minimum performed by male associates. Id. at 1778. 
 113. See id. at 1178. 
 114. Id. at 1179. 
 115. Id. 1192. 
 116. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 512-513 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 117. Id. 
 118. MEZEY, supra note 88, at 168. 
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III. ANALYSIS: WHAT DOES IT TAKE FOR A  
PLAINTIFF TO SUCCEED? 
 
This section first analyzes the pretext model as it requires a plaintiff to 
portray her employer as a liar. It then examines mixed-motive theory and its 
shortcomings in addressing implicit bias absent discriminatory animus. 
Next, it analyzes how judicial deference to employers impacts employment 
discrimination jurisprudence. This section concludes that, in light of recent 
social cognition research, disparate treatment cases are best understood as to 
increase claim uncertainty and courts should reevaluate the current models 
of proof in search of a more cohesive framework for future litigation. 
 
A. THE PRETEXT MODEL OF PROOF “DOUBLE BIND” 
 
Courts have historically construed Title VII to require proof of intent to 
discriminate in disparate treatment cases where only circumstantial evidence 
is available. This section argues that the pretext model of proof, derived from 
McDonnell Douglas, rests on two flawed assumptions: that (1) decision 
makers are self-aware; and (2) it is not feasible for a decision to be both 
driven by an employer’s expressed reasoning and tainted by intergroup bias. 
As the Seventh Circuit noted: “Proof of such discrimination is always 
difficult. Defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit 
discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trial demonstrating it; and because 
most employment decisions involve some discretion, alternative hypotheses 
(including that of simple mistake) will always be possible and often 
plausible.”119 
 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the McDonnell 
Douglas model of disparate treatment proof, the burden of production shifts 
to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason. After the defendant 
states a legitimate reason for its decision, the plaintiff can only prevail by 
proving that the employer’s reasoning was not the actual reason, but a pretext 
for discrimination.120 The Court’s reasoning in McDonnell Douglas is based 
on an inclination to presume discriminatory intent from a finding of 
pretext.121 Although this presumption of intent was never mandatory per se, 
the Supreme Court has treated it as such.122 By implicitly equating an 
 
 119. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 120. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 121. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of 
the “Pretext-Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991). 
 122. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Water, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (finding the McDonnell 
Douglas model of proof to be a “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience”); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (agreeing with 
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employer’s reasoning as a pretext for intentional discrimination, pretext 
analysis rests on two flawed assumptions. 
First, the normative framework of Title VII’s command “not to 
discriminate” rests on the assumption that without discriminatory animus, 
employers will not and cannot discriminate.123 It assumes that employers 
possess “transparency of mind” during decision-making and that they are 
aware of all possible reasons for choosing one employee over another.124 
Pretext analysis further assumes that ill-intentioned employers consciously 
decide to take gender into account, purposefully make their decisions based 
on that awareness, and then design pretexts to avoid liability.125 
Issues with this first assumption stem from a disconnect with cognitive 
social psychology. Often, the legal framework overlooks a decision maker’s 
self-awareness because it assumes that people have open access to the 
content of their own mental processes, such as their perception, 
classification, interpretation, and memory.126 However, empirical 
investigations support the view that “people initially accept as true every 
proposition they comprehend and then go about deciding whether to 
‘unbelieve it.’”127 This assessment is especially true when people are 
mentally preoccupied or unable to engage in meaningful and deliberate 
processing.128 The belief that discriminatory decision-making is separate 
from our automatic processes is erroneous. There is virtually no evidence to 
support the idea that people possess access to their high-level perceptual and 
memorial processes.129 Instead, cognitive biases in social decision-making 
are automatic, rather than resulting from an intent to discriminate, yet 
controlling these biases can be done through subsequent “mental 
correction.”130 If viewed this way, unconscious bias may be understood and 
used to provide employers with the proper tools to understand and correct 
for their automatic mental processes. 
Second, in requiring proof that an employer’s submitted reason was 
 
the Court in Furnco in that a compelling prima facie case raises an inference that inexplainable acts are 
more likely than not based on consideration of intolerable factors). 
 123. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1181. 
 124. Id. at 1185. 
 125. Id. at 1185. 
 126. See, e.g., RICHARD PASSINGHAM, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
11–26, 27–41 (2016). 
 127. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1210. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 1214. 
 130. According to this view, after an unconscious, automatic process called “characterization,” a 
deliberate adjustment or “mental correction” occurs, but only with effort. See DANIEL T. GILBERT AS 
TOLD TO JAMES S. ULEMAN ET AL., THINKING LIGHTLY ABOUT OTHERS: AUTOMATIC COMPONENTS OF 
THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESS IN UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh 
eds., 1989). 
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merely a pretext for discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas model of proof 
essentially requires plaintiffs to find that an employer lied not only to the 
plaintiff but to the court.131 Within this double bind, it is not feasible for a 
promotional decision to be both driven by the employer’s expressed 
reasoning and tainted by intergroup bias—the trier of fact must pick one.132 
Since “smoking gun” evidence seems highly unlikely, a plaintiff’s “best 
shot” is to show that the proffered reason either appears implausible or 
because it is inconsistent with internal precedent.133 Regardless, requiring a 
plaintiff to portray her employer as an “intentional wrongdoer who was lying 
to the court”134 ignores the automatic cognitive processes of many well-
intentioned decision makers. It is perfectly understandable for an employer, 
whose biased perceptions cause him to discriminate against a female 
employee, to honestly believe that a nondiscriminatory reason supports his 
judgment and the subsequent decision.135 
Though current disparate treatment doctrine assumes that 
discriminatory decision-making is somehow separate from the conscious and 
memorial processes that precede it, social cognition theory provides a 
different explanation. Cognitive social psychologists hypothesize that 
stereotypes are just specific instances of categories, schemas, and other 
processes “we adopt and apply to make sense of an otherwise impossibly 
complex perceptual environment.”136 While often providing helpful “rules of 
thumb,” stereotypes can also lead to unintentional poor judgment.137 That is, 
stereotypes can result in discrimination by biasing how people process 
information about others and, as a result, how decisions are made based on 
that information.138 For example, a decision maker may attribute a mistake 
made by a female employee to stable dispositional causes associated with 
her being female, yet be wholly unaware that her gender influenced his 
decision-making.139 For employment discrimination case law to truly 
address implicit biases, courts must understand decision-making through this 
 
 131. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2764 (1993) (“The majority’s scheme, 
therefore, leads to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory reasons for 
their own decisions to hire and fire employees not only will benefit from lying but must lie to defend 
successfully against a disparate-treatment action.”) (citations omitted) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 132. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 (1st Cir. 1974) (“If an employer were to 
Prove that a legitimate reason motivated him, there would be no room left for showing that reason was a 
‘pretext,’ as pretext is ‘a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real 
intention or state of affairs.’”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 133. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1179. 
 134. Id. at 1181. 
 135. See Krieger, supra note 83, at 839. 
 136. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 29, at 306. 
 137. Id. at 307. 
 138. See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1199. 
 139. See id. at 1206-07. 
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social cognitive lens: The law can hold employers liable without making 
insinuations about their virtue or character.140 
 
B. THE MIXED-MOTIVE THEORY FAÇADE 
 
On the surface, mixed-motive theory appears to be the best approach 
for courts to address claims of employment discrimination. After the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, scholars applauded it as “best reflecting the 
reality of actual workplace decisions where it is unlikely that a single motive 
underlies a complicated employment decision.”141 However, beneath the 
surface, mixed-motive theory has not been instrumental in exposing subtle 
discrimination as a result of implicit bias for two predominant reasons.142 
First, as in pretext cases, liability in mixed-motive case law still depends 
on the presence of conscious discriminatory animus.143 Justice Brennan 
wrote that mixed-motive plaintiffs need only prove that their gender “played 
a motivating part” in the adverse employment decision.144 He went on to 
define “play[ing] a . . . part” as, “if we asked the employer at the moment of 
the decision what its reasons were . . . one of those reasons would be that the 
. . . employee was a woman.”145 Under Justice Brennan’s definition, a 
plaintiff still must prove the conscious inclusion of her gender in the 
decision-making process. Since the plaintiff must connect discriminatory 
intent and the use of stereotypes, she will only establish a claim where 
decision-making was the product of conscious or normative constructs. In 
Price Waterhouse, the Court acknowledged subtle stereotypes affecting 
decision-making, yet the stereotypes at play, in that case, were not exactly 
subtle.146 There, partner evaluations described Ann Hopkins as “macho,” 
advised her to “take a course in charm school,” and suggested she “walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”147 The partners’ blatant and 
egregious behavior helped Ann Hopkins’ case but did not do much for 
plaintiffs subjected to subtler forms of discrimination. 
 
 140. See Amelia M. Wirts, Discriminatory Intent and Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for Unwitting 
Discrimination, 58 BOS. COLLEGE L. REV. 809, 855 (2017). 
 141. Selmi, supra note 80, at 45; see also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate 
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2315-17 (1995) (critiquing single-motive theory as an 
unrealistic depiction of the modern workplace); Krieger, supra note 19 (advocating for greater use of the 
mixed-motive model). 
 142. See Selmi, supra note 80, at 45. 
 143. See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1172 (emphasis added). 
 144. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S 228, 250 (1989). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 235. 
 147. Id. 
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Second, mixed-motive theory affords an employer the chance to prove 
that he would have made the same choice despite, even absent, a 
discriminatory motive, which frequently results in limited remedies for 
plaintiffs.148 If a plaintiff establishes that discrimination was a motivating 
factor in an employer’s decision and the employer successfully establishes it 
would have made the same choice anyway, the remedies are limited to 
attorney’s fees and injunctive relief, such as reinstating the employee or any 
other affirmative action the court deems appropriate.149 Seeing as though a 
plaintiff “wins” to the extent she recovers attorney’s fees and goes back to 
work for a (now) potentially adversarial employer, mixed-motive theory has 
not been as effective a tool of addressing subtle discrimination as many had 
hoped.150 
 
C. THE GOLDILOCKS PARADOX: TOO MUCH JUDICIAL DEFERENCE151 
 
Employers are more likely to succeed in employment discrimination 
cases when judges use organizational structures (i.e., policies and practices) 
to rationalize whether discrimination occurred without scrutinizing the 
sufficiency of those structures.152 Judicial deference can occur when judges: 
(1) do not consider the sufficiency of organizational structures, (2) offer 
“mere lip service” to the adequacy of those structures, or (3) use structures 
to infer nondiscrimination even while admitting to the structural 
insufficiency.153 A study on federal equal employment opportunity cases has 
shown that judges have become much more likely to defer to organizational 
structures.154 This issue stems from judges assuming that nondiscrimination 
is the norm and discrimination only happens when employers do something 
immoral and irrational.155 
The trouble naturally lies with employer judgment being based solely 
on subjective criteria. In Ezold, the candidate evaluation process at the firm 
was highly personal and required partners at the firm, not just those the 
 
 148. See Selmi, supra note 80, at 47. 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
 150. See Selmi, supra note 80, at 47 (noting that most mixed-motive cases have resembled traditional 
employment discrimination cases). 
 151. The Goldilocks Paradox refers to the search for judicial deference that is “just right.” 
 152. See Linda H. Krieger, Rachel K. Best & Lauren B. Edelman, When “Best Practices” Win, 
Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Cases, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 843, 844 (2015). 
 153. Id. at 851. 
 154. See id. at 859 (finding that in district courts, deference increased from twenty to thirty percent 
in the 1970s and 1980s to over thirty-five percent by 1999; in circuit courts, deference was not seen before 
1980 but rose to almost thirty percent by the mid-1990s). 
 155. Ironically, liberal judges’ cases were decided more like conservative judges, supporting the 
theory that the trappings of due process may overshadow their pro-plaintiff tendencies. Id. at 862. 
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plaintiff worked with, to evaluate her progress.156 Unlike Hishon, however, 
there was no “smoking gun” of discriminatory statements for her to use as 
evidence of sex-based discrimination. Instead, plaintiff Ezold was not 
assigned complex cases and was later criticized for not working on such 
matters. Further, she watched as her male peers were promoted to partnership 
despite their inferior evaluations.157 Nancy Ezold was given overall 
evaluations of “exceptionally good,” “top-notch,”158 that she will make a 
“fine partner.”159 Despite all the evidence of disparate treatment, the court of 
appeals reversed the lower court’s finding of pretext. It instead stated that 
the trier of fact need only consider the legitimacy of the employer’s proffered 
reason for the decision, not explore all possible motives for it. The appellate 
court disregarded the firm’s assertion that it based partnership decisions on 
analytical ability and that all male associates scored higher than the plaintiff. 
In effect, the judges shielded the firm’s subjective processes from judicial 
review by only examining whether any standards were in place.160 Rather 
than taking into account the effectiveness of existing policies before granting 
discretion, the appellate court essentially immunized upper-level jobs from 
disparate treatment scrutiny.161 The Hishon and Ezold holdings depict the 
discretion granted to the mere presence of subjective employer criteria, 
without any exploration of all possible reasons behind the decision. As a 
result, “judges’ decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered 
by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive 
it feasible to do.”162 
 
D. THE DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCONNECT WITH SOCIAL 
COGNITION THEORY 
 
As it stands, current disparate treatment theory assumes that 
discriminatory employment decisions result from discriminatory motives 
rather than from “normal cognitive processes and strategies that tend to bias 
 
 156. When considering a male associate for partnership, the hiring committee ignored allegations 
brought against him. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1188 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990). 
 157. See id. at 1191–92. 
 158. Id. at 1182. 
 159. Id. at 1183. 
 160. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992) (denying 
judicial deference because “subjective promotion decisions … are not insulated from judicial review for 
unlawful discrimination”).  
 161. See James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study 
of Judicial Behavior, 5 POLITICAL BEHAV., 7, 9 (1983). 
 162. Id. 
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intergroup perception and judgment.”163 According to psychologist Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, a law professor specializing in social cognition theory in 
civil rights law, there are three repercussions for this gap between 
employment discrimination jurisprudence and the reality it attempts to 
represent. 
First, the disconnect between employment jurisprudence and reality 
stems from the nonexistence of the Title VII models of liability in the latter, 
which remain as academic abstractions.164 Without a more consistent 
application to employment discrimination cases, the various theoretical 
models will continue to fail in their potential utility as a framework.165 
Second, this disjointedness could increase the uncertainty of case outcomes 
and related costs.166 With such a complex structure in place, plaintiffs may 
not know what model of liability will govern until well into the litigation. 
With each model comes different requirements of proof and, as a result, 
dissimilar discovery and analysis costs follow. For example, under the 
pretext model of proof where a plaintiff must control for all potential causal 
factors, her lawyer must engage in extensive discovery or else potentially 
face a legal malpractice claim.167 Third, this gap in jurisprudence and reality 
may intensify existing intergroup tensions.168 Courts’ “colorblindness” 
approach169—a legal duty to not consider gender, race, or ethnicity—does 
not address judicial, nor defendant, implicit categorical processes. Social 
psychologists have found that a colorblind decision maker coupled with a 
culture in which gender, race, and ethnicity are salient, even the well-
intentioned will inescapably categorize along gender, racial, and ethnic lines. 
Krieger describes the decision maker not as colorblind, but as “color-
clueless,” meaning he is likely unaware that cognitive sources of intergroup 
bias are distorting his “perceptions, judgments, and decisions.”170 
Consequently, the proscriptive approach in disparate treatment jurisprudence 
has proven to be inefficient. It may serve to deepen existing intergroup 
tensions akin to the Tug-of-War behavioral pattern described by Professor 
Williams and the Center for WorkLife Law. 
 
 
 
 
 163. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1217. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52–65 (2d ed. 1970). 
 166. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1217. 
 167. See id. at 1238. 
 168. See id. at 1217. 
 169. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 
1068 (1991). 
 170. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1217. 
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
This section first discusses the strategies that employers can adopt to 
encourage System 2 processing when making decisions. It then suggests that 
judges should only grant deference once they take into account the 
effectiveness of the existing antidiscrimination structure or policies. It 
further proposes that in doing so, plaintiffs should carry the burden of 
production during an “enhanced discovery” phase. This section concludes 
that an actuating factor model of proof that no longer equates causation with 
intentionality should replace the pretext model of proof. 
 
A. EMPLOYER STRATEGIES 
 
Although white men have long dominated law firm environments, a 
powerful incentive now exists to shift business models of the legal 
profession: Large corporate clients are demanding an increase in women, 
minority associates, and partners. For example, Facebook has required its 
outside counsel to “actively identify and create clear and measurable 
leadership opportunities for women and minorities” while representing the 
company.171 Wal-Mart dropped two law firms due to their dissatisfaction 
with the firms’ lack of diversity.172 Law firms must invest in employees to 
reflect the increasing demand for diversity—not just for their clients, but for 
employee retention and satisfaction, as well. 
Yet we cannot stop our brains from activating certain categorical 
assumptions. Application of these categories, however, can be regulated by 
controlling whether we act on those assumptions. Thus, the following 
proposal, loosely built on the Center for WorkLife Law’s bias interrupter 
“toolkit,”173 will only be effective if the following three requirements are 
met. Employers must have the motivation to reflect on initial 
characterizations, the cognitive resources (processing capacity, time) 
required to reflect, and information to supply a reasoned corrective 
decision.174 Despite the inescapability of automatic activations,175 individual 
methods exist to make promotional practices more objective and merit based. 
 
 171. Christian King et al., Diversity’s Next Step: Developing Minority Partners, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 
2019, 5:52 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1119265/diversity-s-next-step-developing-minority-
partners. 
 172. Karen Donovan, Pushed by Clients, Law Firms Step Up Diversity Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/business/21legal.html. 
 173. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 14–28. 
 174. See BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 29, at 335. 
 175. See KEITH B. PAYNE & BERTRAM GAWRONSKI, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL COGNITION: WHERE IS 
IT COMING FROM? WHERE IS IT NOW? WHERE IS IT GOING? IN THE HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL 
COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS 2 (Keith Payne et al. eds., 2010). 
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1. Use Metrics 
 
Metrics for performance evaluations are advantageous in that they help 
firms identify implicit bias and track the effectiveness of the measures taken 
thus far.176 The Center for Worklife Law suggests specific ways to identify 
and track demographic patterns in accordance with certain tools to analyze 
those metrics.177 In reviewing performance evaluations, supervising 
attorneys should first ask themselves: Are there consistent disparities by 
demographic group? “Do the same performance ratings result in different 
promotion or compensation rates for different groups?”178 For example, 
Reed Smith supplements its annual reviews and options to request 
constructive feedback with an online and mobile app that allows for 
“continuous, detailed feedback from every lawyer with whom an associate 
works.”179 This type of metric collection would allow supervising attorneys, 
the human resources department, and trained corporate psychologists to 
compare data using their varying levels of professional and objective 
expertise. 
Upon establishing these metrics, supervising attorneys should look for 
patterned differences between men, women, men of color, and women of 
color.180 For example, an attorney who identifies similar performance ratings 
by a white male and a woman of color should review each person’s vertical 
growth since they began working at the firm. This data has the opportunity 
to highlight disparities at the department- and firm-level without interrupting 
firms’ unique business models. Since comparisons are made among 
underrepresented groups and not between older and newer employees, new 
law firms are not at a disadvantage. Such metrics would accept the 
unavoidable human margin of error while still assessing performance 
evaluations objectively. 
 
2. Distribute Assignments 
 
More than eighty percent of white male lawyers—but only fifty-nine 
percent of white women lawyers—report having the same access to desirable 
assignments as their colleagues.181 This distribution is more common among 
 
 176. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 22. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Reed Smith Launches Game-Changing Associate Life Initiative, REED SMITH (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/news/2018/05/reed-smith-launches-game-changing-associate-life-initiative. 
 180. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 22 (noting that other 
underrepresented groups the firm tracks, such as LGBTQ people, individuals with disabilities, or military 
veterans, should be analyzed for patterned differences). 
 181. See id. at 18 (finding that only fifty-three percent of women lawyers of color and sixty-three 
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firms that distribute assignments in an “informal, unmonitored manner.”182 
By offering a partnership track and hiring people onto it, a firm must have 
two tasks to ensure it complies with Title VII. First, firms should implement 
a formal procedure for identifying high- and low-profile assignments prior 
to assignment distribution. This task involves convening relevant managers 
to identify such work, based on complexity and novelty, and create a 
typology for the assignments.183 The Center for WorkLife Law suggests 
distributing an “Office Housework Survey” to employees to gauge who is 
doing “glamour” work, “office housework,” and the amount of time spent on 
each.184 Should the typology show that a supervising attorney is 
disproportionately allocating work, their superior should discuss with them 
whether the available pool is diverse and not being fully tapped, or if only a 
few people have the requisite skills for the assignment.185 
Second, performance evaluations based on those assignments should 
require the supervising attorney to indicate specific evidence and consider 
performance and potential separately.186 Rather than writing “[s]he is quick 
on her feet,” partners should be required to explain their ratings, such as “[i]n 
March, she argued X motion in front of Y judge on Z case, answered his 
questions effectively, and was successful in getting the optimal judgment.”187 
Additionally, performance and potential should be assessed separately 
because men are often judged on potential while women are judged on 
performance.188 Under this step, a partner with little to no interaction with 
the employee should not evaluate her—psychologists have found that biases 
are stronger where an employer has not had an opportunity to observe the 
employee.189 Notably, all evaluations should be in writing and preserved by 
the firm in the event of a potential disagreement.190 
 
 
 
 
percent of male lawyers of color reported the same access to desirable assignments as their colleagues). 
 182. Baron, supra note 101, at 312. 
 183. See Kim Elsesser, Female Lawyers Face Widespread Gender Bias, According to New Study, 
FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2018/10/01/female-lawyers-
face-widespread-gender-bias-according-to-new-study/#16f4bb4c4b55. 
 184. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 18 (available at Bias 
Interrupters.org). 
 185. See id. at 20. 
 186. See id. at 23. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. (adding that personality and performance should be separated, as well); see also ABA 
COMM. ON WOMEN IN PROFESSION, FAIR MEASURE: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS 32 
(2d ed. 1997). 
 189. See WAYNE F. CASCIO, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 66 (3d ed. 1987). 
 190. See Baron, supra note 101, at 313. 
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3. Assign Mentors 
 
Adopting mentorship policies that pair a partner or senior associate and 
an associate at the outset of the associate’s career could likely reduce the 
chances of in- and outgroup behavior. Evidence shows that mentors, whether 
acting formally or informally, assist women in appearing more influential 
and can help them win promotions.191 Diversity consultant Verna Myers 
said, “diversity is being invited to the party; inclusion is being asked to 
dance.”192 Structured mentorship policies will move beyond symbolic 
diversity initiatives and allow for a human connection between associates 
and partners that may not otherwise occur. Such pairings can be made during 
orientation if the associate is committed to a particular practice group. If the 
pairing is not useful or the associate is unsure of their practice group, a 
supervising attorney should discuss possible mentorship options with the 
associate. Cravath, Swaine & Moore implemented a mentorship rotation 
system that allows associates to work closely with several partners within 
their practice group or office.193 This model would not only help women 
break into the “old boy networks”194 by being asked to dance, but also assist 
with long-term succession planning for partnership. 
 
4. Rotate “Housework” 
 
To remedy the Tightrope bias women face while taking on higher loads 
of non-career enhancing “office housework,” firms must develop office 
schedules for nonlegal tasks.195 A firm’s office manager can create a 
rotational schedule for menial tasks, such as taking notes during a meeting 
or ordering lunch, that assigns associates on a rotating basis to prevent 
responsibility from falling on one person’s shoulders.196 As this method may 
not solve the problem overnight, Professor Williams suggests that female 
associates pair this technique with snappy comebacks when they are still 
asked to do such tasks. For example, by saying, “I’m not sure you want 
someone with my hourly rate making coffee,” a woman is dodging backlash 
 
 191. See id. at 277. 
 192. Marlen Whitley, BigLaw Doesn’t Have a Diversity Problem, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2018, 11:10 
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1027240/biglaw-doesn-t-have-a-diversity-problem. 
 193. Mentoring & Training, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, https://www.cravath. 
com/mentoringandtraining/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 194. Baron, supra note 101, at 278. 
 195. Caroline Spiezio, Improving Diversity In-House: 4 Tips From the MCAA’s New Report, 
LAW.COM (Sept. 10, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/09/10/improving-diver 
sity-in-house-4-tips-from-the-mccas-new-report/?slreturn=20200123200242. 
 196. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., supra note 49, at 19–20. 
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by doing something masculine (saying no) in a feminine way (being nice).197 
A crucial aspect of rotating housework is to ensure that a firm is not asking 
for volunteers because it can undercut a woman’s authority and also take 
time away from more valuable work. 
 
B. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: “JUST RIGHT” 
 
Although some amount of subjectivity may be necessary when selecting 
candidates for partnership, judges should not blindly grant firms discretion 
merely because they have policies and structures in place. Instead, when 
employers introduce their policies as evidence of nondiscriminatory 
decision-making, judges should first consider whether the structures are 
“adequate, even-handedly applied, and effective in preventing 
discrimination.”198 This Note proposes that once a plaintiff’s claim survives 
a motion to dismiss, she will have the burden of production during an 
“enhanced discovery” phase that provides the judge with data showing the 
ineffectiveness of the law firm’s existing policies. The discovery phase is 
“enhanced” because the plaintiff will gain access to sealed information 
customarily considered outside the scope of the case, such as names of 
people who left the firm or similar claims. This procedural enhancement 
would only benefit those with a well-pleaded complaint after surviving a 
motion to dismiss. Out of fear of the enhanced discovery phase, defendants 
would be incentivized to settle. This data will compel the judge to take into 
account the effectiveness of the firm’s existing policies before he or she 
determines how much deference the employer’s decision deserves.199 
Under the “enhanced discovery” approach, employers are incentivized 
to implement adequate procedures and policies to receive considerable 
deference. This reward-system is not new. For example, when determining 
an employer’s liability for one employee’s sexual harassment of another 
employee, courts consider whether the employer took adequate steps to 
prevent it, such as company policies and grievance procedures.200 If so, 
courts may lessen or eliminate the employer’s liability altogether.201 Further, 
when deciding whether a corporation’s directors or officers satisfied their 
duty of care, courts examine all relevant factors, including the processes and 
steps taken to eliminate self-interest. Once the court determines that the 
 
 197. Allison Kernisky, Rejecting Office Housework Is Hard but Necessary, ABA (May 27, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/practice/2014/rejecting-off 
ice-housework-is-hard-but-necessary/. 
 198. Krieger, Best & Edelman, supra note 152, at 861. 
 199. See Baron, supra note 101, at 309. 
 200. See id. at 316. 
 201. See id. 
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corporation exercised informed judgment, only then does it reduce scrutiny 
under the business judgment rule.202 Just as judges reward careful reflection 
and structured processes in both sexual harassment claims and under the 
business judgment rule, so too should they extend such deference to Title 
VII plaintiffs suing professional employers. 
Removing the scrutiny exemption for upper-level and professional 
employers would not prove to be a burden, as critics suggest. Judges are 
seemingly deterred from thoroughly scrutinizing upper-level employment 
decisions because they (i) lack expertise and (ii) upper-level jobs are 
considered more essential than lower-level jobs.203 With vague criteria used 
to assess the performance of professionals, judges are reluctant to inquire 
into the standards used to evaluate employee performance. However, a lack 
of expertise should not pose a more significant problem for upper-level cases 
than for lower-level cases because judges are likely more familiar with law 
partnerships than with construction crews, for example.204 If upper-level jobs 
are considered more critical than lower-level jobs, then judges should feel 
even more obligated to intrude into personnel decisions about professional 
qualifications to ensure effective policies are in place. The “enhanced 
discovery” phase will allow a plaintiff to produce evidence of a firm’s 
current policies and, only then, will the judge determine the breadth of 
discretion to be granted. 
 
C. ACTUATING FACTOR MODEL OF PROOF 
 
Recent research underlying the social cognition theory has substantially 
destabilized the fundamental assumptions of Title VII’s disparate treatment 
theory.205 Title VII’s disparate treatment doctrine exposes a model of gender 
bias that assumes discrimination is only deliberate, conscious, and 
intentional action by animus-driven employers who know that they are 
discriminating.206 Under this interpretation, a plaintiff who is victimized by 
an employer’s decisions, such as receiving office housework or continually 
being denied partnership, will have no remedy unless she can convince the 
court that the discrimination was intentional.207 As this Note has attempted 
to demonstrate, discrimination can be both automatic (System 1 cognitive 
effects) and intentional (System 2 motivational sources), with the former 
 
 202. See id. at 317. 
 203. See id. at 307–08. 
 204. See id. at 307. 
 205. See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1211. 
 206. See Krieger, supra note 83, at 843–44. 
 207. See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1239. 
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frequently being “beyond ordinary conscious self-awareness.”208 Without 
amending Title VII, there are ways to fine-tune the disparate treatment 
doctrine to address biases stemming from “social categorization and 
cognitive distortions.”209 To fill the gap between employment discrimination 
jurisprudence and cognitive sociology, Krieger proposed eliminating the 
pretext model of individual disparate treatment proof and replacing it with a 
“motivating (actuating) factor” model of proof, loosely built on the Price 
Waterhouse mixed-motive framework.210 Rather than requiring the 
impossible task of disproving every nondiscriminatory reason articulated by 
an employer, this model would focus on the contamination of intergroup bias 
on an employer’s decision-making, such as schematic information 
processing, the automaticity of in-group favoritism, and the salience of 
gender and other social categories.211 
To establish liability in a cognitive bias-based disparate treatment 
claim, a plaintiff would be required to prove that her gender played a role in 
causing the employer’s decision, rather than showing intentionality.212 
Although the same evidence of an employer’s irrational and unjust decision-
making would still be critical in proving the occurrence of discrimination, it 
would be interpreted differently. For example, a showing that a female 
associate was treated less favorably than male associates would be relevant 
to prove that her gender affected the supervising attorney’s decision-making, 
not to show that the decision maker’s proffered reasons for the assignment 
distribution were lies or cover-ups for a real discriminatory motive. 
Comments reflecting gender stereotypes would be relevant to show that the 
female associate’s group membership biased a decision maker’s perception 
and memory of decision-relevant events. The comments would not be 
offered as proof of discriminatory animus. Reformulation of the disparate 
treatment doctrine would better reflect the reality that discrimination can 
occur without intent.213 
Under this proposal, the critical inquiry is whether an employee’s status 
“made a difference” in the decision, not whether the employer intended for 
it to make a difference.214 The importance of the “actuating factor” model of 
proof is two-fold. First, it distinguishes motive and intent, two terms that are 
often conflated and, as a result, cause adjudicatory confusion. As the Seventh 
 
 208. Id. at 1239. 
 209. Id. at 1241. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at 1241–42. 
 212. Id. at 1242 (“The critical inquiry would be whether the applicant or employee’s group status 
‘made a difference’ in the employer’s action, not whether the decisionmaker intended that it make a 
difference.”). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
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Circuit aptly noted, “motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. 
Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or 
omitted.”215 By understanding the term “actuating factor” as something that 
causes a person to act, courts may begin to construct a more accurate and 
adaptable model of disparate treatment discrimination jurisprudence.216 
Second, courts should differentiate between intentional and 
unintentional forms of disparate treatment discrimination in a clearer way. 
Krieger suggests implementing a Title VII two-tier liability system, similar 
to the method currently used in Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) cases.217 Under first-tier disparate treatment liability, a plaintiff 
must prove that her protected class “played a role” in causing the employer 
to decide as he did.218 This Note proposes that unless the defendant can prove 
he would have made the same decision absent the group status’ biasing 
effect, the plaintiff should be entitled to choose between either (a) general 
and individualized injunctive relief, such as ordering the defendant to 
prevent harm and allowing the plaintiff to continue working,219 or (b) a 
corrective statement issued by the firm and equitable relief, such as 
attorney’s fees and back and front pay. 
A plaintiff might choose the latter option out of fear of becoming a 
“social pariah” if she continues to work at the firm. Under this remedy, the 
firm must pay for and issue a public statement or advertisement declaring 
that it did not previously understand implicit bias and that it unintentionally 
discriminated based on sex. Although people may criticize this remedy as 
destroying a firm’s reputation, it effectively puts the burden on law firm to 
convince current and future clients of its changed and improved anti-
discrimination measures. A major tenant of Title VII is to compensate 
victims of sexism, and “victims of implicit bias are no less harmed” than 
victims of conscious sexism.220 
To restore Title VII’s efficacy of shaping social norms,221 courts should 
provide corrective “public shaming” remedies to cognitive bias-based 
disparate treatment plaintiffs. Such a judicial ruling is not new. In United 
States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,222 the U.S. Department of Justice sued 
 
 215. Burlew v. Easton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066-69 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) (finding that intentional discrimination does not necessarily indicate a 
“conscious, deliberate state of mind” in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim). 
 216. See Wirts, supra note 140, at 849–50. 
 217. See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1243. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (noting that these are the same remedies available in a disparate impact case). 
 220. Wirts, supra note 140, at 850. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. 2009), aff’g, 449 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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several major tobacco companies for deliberately misleading the public 
about the dangers of smoking. In finding the tobacco companies guilty, the 
district court ordered each company to create “corrective statements” 
warning the public of the hazards of smoking tobacco, along with an 
admission that the companies intentionally designed cigarettes with enough 
nicotine to create and sustain addiction.223 If this remedy were to apply to 
cognitive bias-based disparate treatment cases, it is reasonable to predict that 
decision makers would endeavor to alleviate the hardships of perceived 
injustices that befall outgroup members. 
Lastly, if a plaintiff can prove that discriminatory decision-making 
resulted from conscious animus, or tier-two liability, she should also be 
entitled to compensatory and punitive damages as stipulated by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.224 By limiting compensatory and punitive damages to 
cases concerning conscious and deliberate discrimination, courts can better 
serve the overarching goal of “improving intergroup relations and 
minimizing both cognitive and motivational sources of discrimination.”225 
Categorization and other cognitive biases predispose us towards unintended, 
and often undesired, discriminatory byproducts of essential mental 
processing. Attaching the risk of substantial financial liability to social 
cognitive judgment will only heighten intergroup anxieties.226 Therefore, 
assigning these remedies to first-tier disparate treatment liability would 
ultimately be counterproductive. 
Under the actuating factor model of proof system, courts can finally 
achieve the goals of Title VII by understanding disparate treatment theory to 
include cognitive bias. By eliminating the pretext model of disparate 
treatment, plaintiffs and defendants can avoid the false dichotomy between 
whether an employer’s justification is “real” or “phony.”227 Instead, the 
actuating factor model would require a plaintiff to prove that her gender 
played a role in the decision-making process, not that the employer intended 
it to do so. Lastly, this model would shift disparate treatment jurisprudence 
away from the long-held proscriptive duty not to discriminate. In alignment 
with social cognition theory, this model would grasp the principle of 
nondiscrimination as a prescriptive duty to “identify and control for errors in 
social perception and judgment which inevitably occur, even among the 
well-intended.”228 
 
 
 223. Id. at 1138. 
 224. See 42 U.S.C. §1981(b)(1). 
 225. Krieger, supra note 19, at 1244. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Id. at 1178. 
 228. Id. at 1245. 
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V. CONCLUSION: MOVING UP THE RANKS 
 
Diversity among the top ranks of the legal profession is not just a benefit 
to women, but their firm and clients. While there may be inherent differences 
in how men and women conduct themselves, as detailed above, these 
distinctions when combined cover more lawyering strategies and behaviors 
than a male-dominated enterprise. Without more, the legal structure does not 
address the effects of implicit bias on gender discrimination in the 
workplace.229 By taking an approach at the individual level, employers are 
better suited to mitigate implicit bias during the promotional decision-
making process. At the judicial level, judges can still defer to employers’ 
decisions granted that the firm’s structures and policies survive the 
“enhanced discovery” phase. Lastly, on the theoretical level, shifting 
disparate treatment theory towards disparate impact theory by addressing 
unintentional discrimination will better reflect the salience of gender 
categories and social stereotypes in the workforce. Due to the prevalence of 
implicit bias in the legal profession, necessary changes must reflect both 
social cognition theory and reality. 
 
there are mountains growing 
beneath our feet 
that cannot be contained 
all we’ve endured 
has prepared us for this 
bring your hammers and fists 
we have a glass ceiling to shatter 
let’s leave this place roofless230 
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140 (1987) (noting that breaking down biases and social cognition will take more than “add[ing] women 
and stir[ring].”). 
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